

EXHIBIT NO. 20

COPY OF A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT COVERING
A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN. THIS MEMORANDUM WAS SENT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER 17, 1941. THE PROPOSED
MESSAGE WAS NOT SENT AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS
TAKEN.

101-201-1170

October 17, 1941.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a redraft of your proposed message to the Emperor of Japan.

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory conversations with us, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister is, at his request, coming to call again this afternoon for a further extended discussion, (b) the message received by Ambassador Grew from Prince Konoye (through Prince Konoye's private secretary) (reported in Mr. Grew's telegram/1646, October 17, 11 a.m.) that the new Japanese cabinet would be one sincerely desirous of improving relations with the United States and of continuing the exploratory conversations, and (c) the word we have that General Tojo, a Konoye adherent and a "moderate",

-2-

"moderate", has been designated by the Emperor to form a new cabinet, we incline to the view that it would be premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor pending further clarification of the situation in Japan and of the probable attitude of the new government.

Enclosure:
Redraft of
proposed
message.

FE:MMH:NES

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PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty on matters of state. I feel I should again address Your Majesty because of a deeper and more far-reaching emergency which appears to be in the process of formation. As Your Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the great purpose of Your Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against the Soviet Union or against British or Dutch or independent territory

-3-

territory in the south, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near Eastern theaters of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas maintained and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americas against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned and would have to seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to prevent any extension of such condition of war.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you here-
with a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of
Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message
to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to
Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the
text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the
substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you
contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential
nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is sug-
gested that you might care to call in the Chinese Am-
bassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them
the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the
Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his
most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to
the Emperor of Japan.

FBI/DOJ/NEC

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1941.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might

serve

-2-

serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

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-3-

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the

amount

-4-

amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
TELEGRAMS
SECTION
NOV 11 1941

Department of State

Washington

[Faint, illegible text, likely a telegram message]

NOV 11 1941

Department of Education


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Cordell

I trust this is true

I think can go in
gray robe - saves time -
I don't mind if it gets
picked up

J. L. S.



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184 - and see
 August 10 1846
 Letter to President
 and
 1846

SECRET

I submit herewith for the Committee the following report on the subject of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The report is based on the information furnished to me by the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the staff of the War Relocation Authority, and the staff of the War Relocation Authority. The report is based on the information furnished to me by the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the staff of the War Relocation Authority, and the staff of the War Relocation Authority.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack on the United States Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The attack was carried out by the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The attack resulted in the destruction of several ships and aircraft, and the death of many personnel. The attack was a major event in the history of the United States and the world.

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11-11-41

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Franklin D. Roosevelt